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Abstract:
Merchant electricity transmission investment is a practically relevant example of an
unregulated investment with monopoly properties. However, while leaving the
investment decision to the market, the regulator may decide to prohibit capacity
withholding with a must-offer provision. This paper examines the welfare effects of a
must-offer provision prior to the capacity choice, given three reasons for capacity
withholding: uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment. A must-offer
provision will decrease welfare in the first two cases, and can enhance welfare only in
the last case. In the presence of importer market power, a regulatory test might be
needed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economists are alert to the potential inefficiencies of regulation, and have devoted
considerable effort to devising market mechanisms that might reduce some of these
inefficiencies. The high pressure gas network in Britain (the National Transmission System)
operates under regulated Third Party Access (rTPA, considered the best form of regulation,
and now required by the 2003 EU Energy Directives) but in the past this required the
regulator to set the transmission tariffs. The form chosen was an entry and exit capacity
charge that could (and did) give rise to serious problems of efficient rationing in the presence
of excess entry demand. The solution, which worked well, was to adopt auctions for entry
capacity while continuing to set exit charges according to long-run marginal cost (McDaniel
and Neuhoff, 2004). For similar reasons, electricity transmission lines are best subject to
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2rTPA, but the EU Regulation on Cross-border Exchange (EC, 2003) requires that congestion
management should use “market-based solutions” such as auctions.
Using auctions to allocate access to existing scarce natural monopolies is efficient,
provided there are sufficiently many users wishing access, and this has encouraged regulators
to explore market-based solutions for guiding investment decisions in such natural
monopolies, although this turns out to be considerably more difficult (Newbery and
McDaniel, 2003). This paper explores a particular solution to this problem, in which private
investors are invited to construct electricity transmission lines in return for the rights to the
revenue created by the spot price differential across the line. These market prices would
therefore signal the need for, and provide the revenue to, finance that investment, reducing
the cost to final consumers of mistaken regulated investment.
In the past vertically integrated companies (either state-owned or regulated utilities)
invested in transmission to meet specified security standards and to deliver power efficiently.
In liberalised markets transmission must not only ensure network integrity and reliability, but
must also respond to the needs of generators who are no longer under the control of the
utility. Regulated transmission system operators (TSOs) are still responsible for managing
and maintaining the existing network, and for investments that pass a regulatory test, and
whose costs can therefore be recovered from regulated transmission charges. Wholesale
electricity markets now open new opportunities for transmission investment, as they provide
opportunties for wheeling power from low price to high price locations. The resulting
revenue makes it possible to contemplate merchant transmission investment (MTI), and as a
result many jurisdictions now allow third parties to invest in transmission.
Merchant transmission projects are already operating in the USA and Australia, and
are under consideration in Europe. There is a difference between the USA on the one hand
and Europe and Australia on the other. The nodal pricing approach for congestion
management in the USA allows for a rather refined approach towards MTI, as prices differ by
nodes, and point-to-point incremental Financial Transmission Rights can be designed to
internalise network effects induced by loopflows.2 The rather crude zonal or regional pricing
approach for congestion management in Europe and Australia restricts MTI to inter-regional
interconnectors operating with direct current (DC) technology. High voltage DC (HVDC)
interconnectors are controllable and can thus prevent unwanted loop flows. These
interconnectors connect two different networks and are rewarded by the price differentials
between the two ends of the line.3
This paper considers the regulatory issues that arise in the European and Australian
context. For this setting the Australian ACCC provides the following useful definition of MTI
as transmission investment “operating between two connection points assigned to different
regional reference nodes, [..] supported by the revenue stream generated by trading electricity
between the two interconnected regions, [and] not eligible to earn regulated revenue.”
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3[ACCC, 2001, p. 126]. Note in particular that this means that the market-based revenues are
unregulated and the same time that the investor is not eligible to regulated (non-user-specific)
connection charges.
The regulatory debate has been provoked in Europe by the proposed BritNed
interconnector. BritNed is a 200 km long subsea HVDC cable connecting the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands, planned to be operational in 2007. The original planned
capacity was 1320 MW, but this was revised to 600 MW. BritNed is a legally separate
subsidiary, fully owned by the TSO in the UK, National Grid Company (NGC) and the TSO
in the Netherlands, TenneT. The construction costs are estimated at about €350 million,
partly funded by the EU’s program on trans-European networks (TEN). Revenues will be
derived predominantly from trading between the two power exchanges (the UKPX in London
and APX in Amsterdam). Depending on various assumptions, the profitability has been
calculated between 7 and 23% [Newbery, Von der Fehr & Van Damme, 2003, p. 8]. Due to
perceived high risk, the project is becoming increasingly uncertain. The first merchant EU
interconnector to go ahead is Estlink connecting the Baltic States and Finland. The European
Commission approved the regulatory exemption already granted by the electricity regulatory
authorities in Estonia and Finland, which provided the necessary assurances to the banks and
investors.
The legal framework for European MTI is laid down in the EU Regulation on Cross-
border Exchange (EC, 2003), which entered into force on 1 July 2004. Art. 7 of the
Regulation allows new interconnectors to be exempted from regulated third party access,
although under rather stringent conditions. These include that the project should enhance
competition in electricity supply, and that exempting it from regulation does not adversely
affect the efficient functioning of the electricity market or the regulated transmission system.
In addition, the project must be risky, legally separated from the TSOs of the systems it
interconnects, and must be DC (except where DC is prohibitively expensive as compared to
the more normal AC). The requirement that the project should be risky to qualify for
exemption is important as will become clear below.
Why would one want to allow unregulated MTI in the first place? After all,
transmission investment remains a classic natural monopoly requiring regulation to prevent
consumer exploitation and to assure independent generators of equal access to the market.
There is clearly an attraction of replacing regulation by market forces where possible,
although in the past the public good nature of most network investment has made this
problematic for transmission investment. The main reason for opening transmission
investment to profit-motivated merchant investors is that this may go some way to addressing
the perceived problem of under-investment in transmission, particularly between systems
under different TSOs. Such under-investment can arise for three reasons. First, vertically
integrated utilities, owning both generation and transmission assets, have relatively poor
incentives to interconnect their systems. Stronger interconnection will give some gains from
trade, but increases competition in their respective generation markets and may reduce
profits. If vertical separation of transmission from generation is not feasible, an alternative
approach to this problem is to allow third parties to invest in transmission assets.
4The second reason is that a new interconnector will as a rule decrease prices on the
importing side, but increase prices on the exporting side. If agencies at each end of the line
are authorised to grant or with-hold permission to build the line, the losing side may be
tempted to block construction of the line although the line might be globally welfare
enhancing. One approach to this problem is to reduce the thresholds for approval and thereby
reduce the authority of the agencies. Under market-based investment commercial feasibility
is the ultimate criterion which is for the investors to decide.
The third reason was extensively discussed in Australia and well summarised in Gans
& King [2003]. The argument relies on regulatory uncertainty concerning risky new
investment and the inability of regulators to commit credibly to refrain from “clawing back”
revenues after the investment has been sunk.4 Suppose that the rate of return of the risky
investment in case of a bad state of the world is 6%, but 14% in a good state. If both states
have equal probability the risk-equivalent expected return would be 10%, which might serve
as the agreed base for the regulated prices. At some point, usually after 3 to 5 years, a review
sets out the rules for the price caps for the next round. The argument is that a regulator will
not modify its original views if the state of the world is bad, while the regulator will be
tempted to strengthen rate regulation if the world turns out to be good. Assume that the
regulator might reduce the allowed prices such that the rate of return is 10% if the good state
occurs. Anticipating this, the expected rate of return is 8% rather than the required 10%. It is
straightforward to see that this may lead to underinvestment or abandoning the project. It is
argued that credibility to refrain from intervening is increased by not regulating the risky new
investment at all (for a predetermined number of years) by granting a “regulation holiday”.
The emergence of unregulated market-based transmission investment raises a set of
regulatory issues. Some of these have been explored by the Dutch electricity regulator in
anticipation on BritNed [Newbery, Von der Fehr & Van Damme, 2003; Brunekreeft, 2005].
The questions raised concern ownership, the access regime, the appropriate share of long-
term versus short-term access rights, and the application of a must-offer or use-it-or-lose-it
provision. The EU Regulation mentioned above sets the rules for these provisions. Perhaps
surprisingly, given the reasons for relaxing regulation, art. 7 does not exempt new
interconnectors from arts. 6.3 and 6.4. Art. 6.3 states that: “the maximum capacity of the
interconnector [..] shall be made available to market participants [..]”, and art 6.4 amplifies
this: “ [..] any allocated capacity that will not be used shall be reattributed to the market, in an
open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner.”
For the purpose of this paper, these articles will be called a must-offer provision (art.
6.3) and a use-it-or-lose-it provision (art. 6.4) respectively. These will be abbreviated with
MO and UIOLI respectively. The distinction we draw between the two is that MO applies to
the owner of the interconnector, who must offer all of the capacity available to capacity
holders, while UIOLI applies to the subsequent holders of capacity rights, who have their
rights returned to the (capacity rights or interconnector auction) market if they are not
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5declared to the System Operators a certain number of hours or days in advance of the relevant
time. The practical distinction is that the owner is in a position to exercise market power by
withholding capacity from the market in certain periods, while capacity holders may be too
numerous for it to be attractive for any single user to withhold capacity, even though
collectively it would be profitable to withhold capacity.
This paper addresses the question whether it can be desirable for merchant investors
to be allowed to withhold capacity from the market, that is, whether to waive the MO
provision under some circumstances. The basic trade-off is that an MO provision may
forestall capacity withholding of an already-constructed interconnector and thereby increase
short term welfare, but may have a detrimental effect on the investment (in size and timing).5
The concept of must-offer provision is relatively new and has not received much attention.
One prominent application is in power generation in the USA where the federal regulator
tries to identify (abuse of) market power via observed capacity withholding. Harvey and
Hogan [2001] provide a critical assessment of this policy, by pointing out that capacity
withholding also occurs  in competitive markets.
As noted, the distinction between MO and UIOLI refers to the two different levels at
which capacity utilisation should be considered. The first applies to the decision of the
investor about the size of the line, while the second applies to the decisions by the users of
the line. If the investor sells off capacity rights to use the line, these decisions differ. The
open-access regime in the USA with the requirement to auction off the (financial)
transmission rights emphasises this difference. In the Australian safe-harbour-approach it is
left to the line owner to decide whether or not to sell usage rights and as a result the access
question is left to the line owner; thus owner and user can, but need not, be the same. Europe
seems more likely to follow the Australian approach, because art. 7 of the EU Regulation can
exempt the new interconnector from (regulated) Third Party Access.6 The term must-offer
will be reserved for the line owner and thus to the allocation of the capacity rights.7 A must-
offer provision then simply means that all available capacity should be offered in the market,
or in other words, that capacity withholding is not allowed.
The two provisions are distinct but related, as follows. The theory of vertical relations
is helpful, where the investor-level is denoted upstream, and the user-level downstream.8
Three points are worth noting. First, an upstream MO provision may also require a
downstream UIOLI rule. Otherwise the upstream line owner will attempt to offer all the
rights to the single highest bidding user, who will then internalise the profits of capacity
withholding and pay for this with the winning bid. Whether this is possible depends crucially
                                                
5
 The articles 6(3) and 6(4) have been included for existing interconnectors, but because art. 7 does not exempt
new interconnectors from these articles, they carry over to new interconnectors. Since a provision like that will
in general affect the investment decision, the difference between existing and new interconnectors is significant.
6
 Whether this exemption applies to the “third party access” requirement or only to “regulated” requirement
remains an open question.
7
 Concerning the allocation of the line’s capacity it is unclear “what is lost if not used”; hence, the term MO
would be unfortunate for the allocation of the capacity rights.
8
 See e.g. Perry [1989] for a survey and Brunekreeft [2002] for an application to the unregulated and vertically
integrated German electricity supply industry
6on the details of the auction [cf. Joskow & Tirole, 2000; and Grossman & Hart, 1980]. This is
equivalent to leveraging market power. Second, if there is no MO provision, then it will
generally be in the interest of the line owner to secure maximum profits either by withholding
capacity at the upstream level or securing the possibility to do so at the downstream level.
Hence, a downstream UIOLI rule will be superfluous. Third, if there is a downstream UIOLI
rule, then an MO provision should be applied as well; otherwise the downstream UIOLI rule
would likely be by-passed at the upstream level. Whether that is possible depends on the
design of the usage rights. The line owner would not be able to withhold capacity if all
capacity were sold off on long-term contracts. However, if a sufficiently large fraction of
capacity is reserved as short-term contracts, or even spot capacity, then the line owner does
have the possibility to withhold capacity.
A related point is whether these provision can be enforced at all. First, there might be
legitimate reasons why not all capacity can be offered at some point, for instance for
maintenance and unforeseen outages. These reasons can be exploited strategically to withhold
capacity. However, these concerns appear more problematic with generation assets than with
transmission assets that are normally far more reliable. Second, the capacity may be offered
at prohibitively high prices at which there is no demand. This seems most likely at the user
level. Suppose there is one single user with all the capacity rights. This user can withhold
capacity by offering the imported energy (for which the capacity rights are used) in the
energy market at a prohibitively high price; as a result of lacking demand this capacity would
not be scheduled and in effect capacity would be withheld. This is likely to be more
problematic in a (pay-as-bid) auction for spot interconnection capacity. In the context of
generators’ must-offer rules in the USA, this very real problem triggers a bid-pricing analysis
by FERC: strategic withholding is said to occur if bids are higher than both the full
incremental costs and the market price [cf. Harvey & Hogan, 2001, p. 15]. This argument
loses relevance if there is sufficient competition among the line users.
Whether an MO provision is enforceable depends on pricing. Registered prices (i.e.
the line owner simply sets a price) can be prohibitively high, whereas an auction would
require a prohibitively high reservation price. In any case, prohibitively high prices may
arouse suspicions of abuse of market power and attract attention, but at the same time given
that the revenues are unregulated this will be quite hard to identify, particularly if the capacity
is sold for different periods. Thus it may be reasonable to set a very high reservation price for
peak hours in high demand periods, and a far lower price for night-time use. If the object in
allowing merchant investment is to address under-investment in interconnection, it would
seem perverse to restrict the opportunities to earn sufficient profits to make the lumpy
investment worthwhile. For the moment we leave these wider competition policy issues on
one side  and concentrate on an MO provision (implicitly assuming that the line owner is the
single user of the line) and assume that the provision is enforceable.
The paper considers a variety of cases to determine whether there are robust
regulatory rules about when to impose MO and when to waive the MO provision. In the
simplest case discussed first, the only relevant source of market power lies in the control of
the interconnector. In the second case the importing country also suffers from market power.
7Within each of these cases there are a variety of reasons for, and possible patterns of trade
over, the interconnector. It may be that flows are always in one direction, from a permanently
surplus low cost producer, or they may vary in direction depending on the time of day or
season (e.g. from a storage hydro system such as Norway to a thermal system such as the
Netherlands). Import demand may vary about an unchanged average or evolve over time,
raising questions of investment timing as well as amount.
The simplest case to consider is where the only relevant market power lies with the
owner of the interconnector and the line always imports. Generators in the importing country
behave competitively, so the line owner faces a residual demand schedule. As a further
simplification the costs of importing power (purchase cost abroad and any transmission
losses) are normalised to zero (i.e. the relevant domestic price is the excess over the import
cost). The actual cost of cheap imported power only makes a difference if there are generators
in the importing market with different marginal costs. While these two simplifications
sacrifice realism they do allow us to concentrate on the effects of an MO provision applied to
the line, which will be the primary aim of section 2. Section 3 will relax the assumptions.
In order to analyse the effects of an MO provision, the reasons for capacity
withholding need first to be identified. Given that revenues are unregulated, and given that
the capacity decision still has to be made, it is not immediately obvious why capacity
withholding would be a profitable strategy. We examine three reasons for possible capacity
withholding:
i) Demand uncertainty and demand variability (i.e. predicted variations in the
determinants of the spot price);
ii) demand growth; and
iii) pre-emptive investment.
The conclusions are as follows. If demand uncertainty is the driver for capacity
withholding, an MO provision is unambiguously weakly welfare decreasing. Furthermore, an
MO provision unambiguously delays new investment and decreases the capacity in
anticipation of demand growth; while numerical analysis suggests that it decreases welfare. If
pre-emptive investment is the determinant of the line capacity, then an MO provision is likely
to increase welfare. If the line owner competes against generators on the importing side, their
market power on the energy market drives a wedge between cost and price in the importing
market. An interconnector can exploit this wedge even if the importing cost is higher than in
the importing market. Thus in such case MTI may be welfare decreasing.
2. MONOPOLY INTERCONNECTOR, COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKETS
2.1 Demand uncertainty
One of the important arguments for not regulating MTI is the risk that if regulated, the
investor fears that he would lose the upside gains from risky new investment but bear the
downside losses. Risk requires some source of uncertainty that is modelled as (residual)
demand uncertainty. Demand uncertainty also provides a motive for capacity withholding.
8With ex ante demand uncertainty it may a profitable strategy to choose capacity for demand
states in which the residual demand elasticity is high and withhold capacity in cases where
the demand elasticity is low. That would be profitable if the monopoly output were below full
capacity. This situation can be countered with an MO provision, which, however, will affect
the investment decision.
This section considers the case of linear (residual) demand but fairly general demand
uncertainty. The results are strong and likely to generalise to a wider class of demand
functions. The costs of building the line are assumed to be:
,)( KFKC ⋅+= β (1)
where K is the capacity of the line, F is the fixed and β the variable construction costs
(expressed as hourly equivalents, so that, for example, when K is measured in MW, β will be
a cost per MWh). The operational output of the line is Q, with Q ≤  K. An MO provision
requires Q = K.
The inverse demand schedule is
sssssss b/aQ,Qbap <−= ,  for s = L, H. (2)
where ps  is the price difference across the interconnector in state of the world s, Qs  is the
flow over the interconnector (Qs ≤ K) and the price difference (for any level of demand) is
high in state of the world s = H, and low in state of the world s = L. The condition on Qs
ensures that the efficient price never falls to zero.9 Let αs be the probability of state s, with
Σαs = 1. Let the expected values of the state-dependent parameters take their unsubscripted
values, thus Eas = Σαs as = a, and similarly Ebs = b.
The MO provision
The line investor's objective is to choose capacity and output to maximise profits:
KQ.t.sKQ)Q(pmax s
s
sssss
K,Qs
≤−= ∑ βαpi . (3)
The Lagrangean is
( ) KKQQ)Q(pL
s
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s
ssss βλα ∑∑ −−−= , (4)
and the respective first order conditions are:
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We contrast three cases: the case in which capacity can be withheld from the market, the
case of no capacity withholding, or MO, and the welfare maximising choice of K and Q. At this
stage we do not know in which state of the world it might be profitable to withhold capacity, so
define that state as state s = w (for withholding) and the state in which the capacity constraint
binds as state s = c (for capacity constrained).10
Capacity withholding: In this case the shadow price of capacity in that state is zero: λw = 0,
hence λc = β from (6). Solving (5) and (6) gives:
 ,
b
a
 = Q
w
w
w 2
(7)
. 
b
 - 
b
a
 = K = Q
ccc
c
c
α
β
22
(8)
No capacity withholding (MO): In this case the capacity constraint binds (weakly) in all
(both) demand states and Qs = K for all s.  Solving (5) and (6) gives the value for K=KN:
. 
b
 - a
 =K Q NN
2
β
= (9)
If the line owner chooses not to withhold capacity even if allowed, then the MO
condition is not binding. In that case Qw = Qc. If capacity withholding is profitable it must be
that Qw < Qc, which requires that
 ,
b
 - 
b
a
 < 
b
a
ccc
c
w
w
α
β
222
(10)
i.e.
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c
cc *Β≡





εεααβ (11)
where εs is the elasticity of demand in state s (as a positive number) measured at a reference
output level Q. Capacity withholding is therefore only profitable if the residual demand
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schedule is less elastic in one state (the state in which it may be profitable to withhold
capacity). Withholding capacity is more likely the lower is the marginal cost of capacity
expansion, β, the lower is the likelihood of a state of the world in which capacity may be
profitably withheld, αw = 1- αc, and the larger is the absolute difference in the demand
elasticities in the two states.
The least favourable case for covering fixed costs is MO, and the condition for
positive net profits is then EpsKN > C(KN), or, substituting from (1) and (9), (a – β)2 > 4bF.
We assume that this is satisfied in what follows.
Social welfare maximising case.
In this case the expected price (rather than the expected marginal revenue) is equal to the
LRMC of capacity: Σαs ps = β,11 and Qs = K in all states, so that:
( )∑ ∑ =−=
s s
sssss Kbap βαα , (12)
and so
NK
b
aK 2* =−= β . (13)
This demonstrates that given a choice (and assuming no threats from pre-emption), merchant
investment will be less than the efficient level K* (and in the case of linear demand only half
the efficient level).
The main result of this section is that in this case, if line owners are free to withhold
capacity and choose to do so, social welfare will be higher than if they are prevented from
withholding capacity, i.e. are subject to an effective MO provision.
Proposition 1. Under ex ante demand uncertainty, social welfare is weakly higher with
capacity withholding than under MO.
Proof: We need to prove that social welfare without an MO provision (SW) should be larger
than the case with an MO provision or No withholding SWN. Using the same notation as
before (subscript w for the state of lower output and c for capacity output):
[ ]NcNccww QQSWSWSWSW −−−+=∆ βαα
Next evaluate the change in social welfare at optimized quantities by taking the total
differential wrt β. Define Γ(β) for d∆SW(β)/dβ. We will show that Γ(β) < 0, for β < B*. This
means that if capacity withholding is profitable, it also increases welfare. Under linear
demand ( ) ssss QpaSW += 21 . The optimized quantities are as in (7) to (9). Note that
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NN bQap −= , with a and b defined as before, and that Qw and wp do not depend on β.
Substituting, differentiating w.r.t. β and simplifying gives:
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This expression has straightforward properties. Note that
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.
Moreover, substituting β = B* from (11) gives .0=Γ  This implies that Γ is linearly
increasing in β and is uniquely zero at β = B*. Hence, for β < B*, Γ < 0. Starting from β = B*,
where the cases exactly meet, decreasing β slightly would trigger capacity withholding which
improves welfare. This continues to be the case. For the case, β > B* the outcomes of the two
cases overlap and hence social welfare is the same for both cases. In total, the MO provision
weakly decreases social welfare. QED.
The intuition is straightforward. Depending on parameters, the firm may find it
profitable to speculate on the high-demand case and invest in a sufficiently large capacity; if
ex-post demand is low, then the output will be reduced below capacity. A must-offer
provision makes the low-demand case less profitable and will in effect induce the firm to
reduce invested capacity to restore the balance between high- and low-demand marginal
profits. A must-offer provision thus increases social welfare in the low demand state, but
reduces social welfare in the high demand state. On balance, the must-offer provision
decreases social welfare. Overall, demand uncertainty bears a close relation to the analytical
framework of peak-load pricing as in Steiner [1957]. This also implies that demand
variability is covered by the analysis.
It may be emphasised that this case appears to be relevant. Risky investment is one of
the arguments underlying the discussion on unregulated MTI in the first place and is one of
the preconditions to qualify for the exemption from regulation in the EU Regulation. It seems
only consistent that if risk is the reason for refraining from regulation, that the same argument
should apply with respect to an MO provision.
2.2 Demand growth
Predictable demand growth raises more complex questions, as now merchant investors must
choose the timing and capacity of the interconnector, both of which are likely to be influenced
by any MO requirements (and the design of any initial open seasons auctions). The simplest case
that captures the spirit of demand growth without unbounded growth in price differentials would
be
12
 ,Q(t)eb - a = p(t) -gt  Q(t) ≤ aegT/b,
where again p(t) is the price at date t. This has the agreeable property that at unchanged price,
p, demand grows at a steady rate g. In the simplest case there is only one investor who makes
a single investment decision.
Merchant investment under an MO provision
If the investment decision is made under MO, then Q(t) = K, for all t ≥ T, the date of opening
of the interconnector, provided that K ≤ aegT/b, otherwise the price would fall to zero until
demand rose sufficiently. An investor (at least one not concerned with any threat of pre-
emption) would not choose to invest excessively or prematurely under MO, as profits would
be zero until the capacity constraint binds, but costs would be incurred unnecessarily soon.
Using the notation superscript wo means without the MO provision, and w means with the
MO provision. It follows that K > aegT/b, so the investor chooses Kw,  Tw to maximise
( )( ) dt.e F - Kbe - Ka  = ) TK,( rt-gt
T
2−
∞
−∫ βpi (14)
The Appendix shows that the profit-maximising choices of Kw and Tw are:
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provided that F is sufficiently large for this to exceed 1 (otherwise investment takes place
immediately and should have already occurred). In what follows we assume that F is
sufficiently large that it is socially optimal to delay investment, so that we are looking at an
interesting ex ante choice problem, rather than regretting failures to invest in the past.
Socially optimal investment
Whereas a merchant investor would never invest in enough capacity to drive the price to zero,
a regulated investor charged to maximise social welfare might find the consumer surplus at
zero price sufficiently high to justify such a choice of capacity. There are thus two cases to
consider, depending on whether it is optimal to invest early and enjoy a period of spare
capacity and zero price, or whether the interconnector will be delayed until it is fully used.
The second case is particularly simple to solve as the social maximand differs from the
merchant choice under MO solely by replacing b in (14) by b/2. It then follows immediately
that the socially optimal choices of K*, T* (where * indicates the socially optimal choice) is
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It follows that T* < T w. We note that in this case the merchant investor chooses the efficient
level of capacity but delays until demand is twice as high as at the socially optimal date.
If, on the other hand, it is desirable to invest earlier, the social maximand is
( ) ( )( ) . K  Q(t)    ,dte F - K - tQbe - taQ  = ) TW(K, rt-gt
T
≤−
∞
∫ β221 (19)
Line usage Q(t) when Q(t) < K is set to drive the price to zero:
. 
b
ae
 = K = Q(M)   , M< t    ,
b
ea
 = Q(t)
gMgt
(20)
This is solved for the socially optimal values K** and T**:
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The second case of under-used capacity holds provided M > T, or (as the Appendix shows) if
θ > 1, which is equivalent to β < ag/(r+g). Thus early investment with under-used capacity is
socially optimal if the LRMC of expanding the interconnector is low (relative to the price)
and the discount rate is low (relative to the rate of growth).
Merchant investment without MO
The next question is whether removing the MO provision improves matters for market
investment. This seems intuitively likely, given that MO could result in an earlier date of
investment, although it is not immediately clear what effect (if any) it has on the choice of K.
Again there is a direct read-across from the socially optimal choice allowing for a period of
under-utilised capacity and the merchant maximand, by replacing the b/2 in (19) by b to give
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It follows that Two > T**. Note as above that while the welfare maximiser invests earlier than
the merchant, the capacity choices of the merchant and welfare maximiser are the same.12
This rather surprising result appears to contradict the textbook static case where the
monopoly outcome is half the welfare maximising outcome and needs some clarifying words.
The process above only holds for θ > 1. This requires in particular that demand growth
g is sufficiently large. If this condition is fulfilled then K** = Kwo and (or rather because) Two >
T**. Demand growth creates the option to wait. If by static comparison, g decreases two
things happen: the investment moment T decreases and the capacity K decreases in both
cases. At the moment that the optimal investment moment is now (i.e. T = 0), the process
stops, as negative time is clearly not allowed. At parameter values such that T** = 0,
investment time of merchant is still positive Two > 0. If parameters are changed further,
nothing changes anymore in the welfare-optimising case,13 while both Two and Kwo are still
reduced. And thus K** > Kwo. This continues until also Two = 0. At that moment,  K** = a/b
for the welfare case and Kwo = a/2b for the profit-maximising case. Hence, we see that if g
decreases (and drops below a critical value for which θ < 1), the capacities diverge from each
other and instead converge to the static textbook case.
The next step is to rank the outcomes with and without the MO provision. We proceed
in steps.
Proposition 2A: MO is irrelevant if β > ag/(r+g).
Proof: The value of M that solves egM = bK/a has M < T for θ < 1, and in that case it will be
profitable to fully use the capacity at the date of investment. The Appendix shows the
condition θ < 1 is equivalent to β > ag/(r+g).
An MO provision thus only has an effect if θ > 1. Given its crucial importance, θ
deserves somewhat more attention. Examination of g reveals that θ goes to 1 for g approaching
zero, decreases if g increases from zero, reaches a minimum and then increases monotonically.
Hence θ > 1 for some g > g*. θ and g* are critically determined by β; θ falls with increasing β.
In words, an MO provision loses relevance if the growth rate is small and capacity expansion
costs are high. The MO provision only has meaning if the investor would withhold capacity. If β
                                                
12
 The equality depends rather critically on the specification of demand (growth), in particular the fact that ‘a’
does not change.
13
 Technically speaking, the outcome where the capacity with withholding is smaller than the minimum capacity
as defined above, occurs only for T < 0 which of course should be excluded.
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is high, early oversized investment with capacity withholding for some time is expensive. What
happens endogenously in the solutions is that as β increases (and thus θ decreases), both T and M
increase while (T - M) decreases (and K increases). At exactly θ = 1, T = M, and for θ < 1, T >
M. This says that as β increases, the strategy of capacity withholding loses relevance until it
vanishes altogether (T = M). Note that if T > M (and thus θ < 1) the constraint Q ≤ K binds.
Proposition 2B: When the MO provision has an effect, it decreases capacity. That is, if θ > 1,
Kwo > Kw.
Proof: We need to establish the inequality in
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First note that using (15), (17), (23) and (25) that at θ = 1, wow KKKK ===
≥≤ 1
**
1
*
θθ
. Kw
is increasing in β and therefore decreasing in θ, while Kwo is increasing in θ. QED.
Proposition 2C: When the MO provision has an effect, it delays investment. That is, for θ >
1, Two < Tw.
Proof:  Again note from (16) and (24) that Two = Tw at θ = 1. By differentiation, Tw - Two is
decreasing in β and therefore increasing in θ at θ ≥ 1. QED.
Conjecture: SWwo > SWw, for θ > 1. Since SWwo = SWw, for θ ≤ 1, the implication is that an
MO provision weakly decreases social welfare.
Numerical analysis confirms the conjecture over a wide range of parameter values. The
analytical intuition for its plausibility is as follows. Consider figure 1.
Figure 1: Time line for θ > 1
With θ = 1, Two = M = Tw , Qwo = Kwo = Kw, and (thus) SWwo = SWw. Outcomes in timing,
capacity and output start to diverge if θ > 1. A first effect is that Kwo > Kw, implying that if
production is at full capacity, the welfare effect of the MO is negative. A second effect is that
(M - Two) increases, implying a longer period with Qwo < Kwo. This effect consists of two
opposing effects. First, (Tw - Two) increases, meaning that for a longer period there will be
without MO
with MO
Two
Tw
M
TA
time
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investment (and output) without an MO provision and none with. During this period an MO
provision decreases welfare. Second, M - Tw increases, which implies a longer period where
Qwo < Qw = Kw < Kwo, which is positive for an MO provision. Since at M, Qwo = Kwo > Kw,
there must a point TA < M at which SWwo = SWw (and larger beyond that TA). The numerical
computations suggest that the positive effect of an MO provision (between Tw and TA) is more
than offset by the welfare reducing effects outside this range.
Clearly, this analysis is incomplete, as one might wish to consider a sequence of
investments in a growing market (or otherwise consider why the interconnector market may
cease to grow) and one may also wish to consider competition between potential investors, as
an investment race. The first case is unlikely to add anything but complexity. We have not
formally examined the investment race for two reasons. First, empirically, racing to build
high voltage interconnectors does not seem very relevant. The question is whether there will
be a potential investor at all. Thus in the case of BritNed it seems that the only candidates are
the TSOs on both sides who formed a joint venture. To the knowledge of the authors, there
are no other candidates. Second, the main focus of investment races is on the dissemination
of benefits; particularly where competition on the downstream market is less than perfect.14
We briefly discuss imperfect downstream competition in section 3, but leave the case of
growing demand and possible investment races to further research.
For the case of a large number of potential investors and perfect downstream
competition, which implies zero excess profits, the following informal observations can be
made. Denote subscript “R” for the racing scenario. Because the investor without an MO
provision can always mimic the outcome under an MO provision it follows that wwo pipi ≥ ,
and thus wR
wo
R TT ≤ . Thus the following must hold:
∫∫
∞
−
∞
− ≥
mo
R
wo
R T
rtw
T
rtwo dtedte pipi (27)
Here, π is defined net of investment cost. Perfectly competitive racing implies that the net
present value of cash flow must be just equal to the discounted investment cost, and thus
wwo
rTw
R
rTwo
R e)K(Ce)K(C −− ≥ , and thus if the investment cost are increasing in K, we can
draw no immediate conclusions for capacity. However, we observe that the investor not
subject to an MO provision can only increase profits (compared to the MO provision) by
making larger profits in the later periods of higher demand, which requires larger capacity.
Hence we may conclude that racing will speed up the investment as compared to no racing,
but that the results with respect to the MO provision do not change.
                                                
14
 Seminal in the context of innovation is Katz & Shapiro [1987], which builds upon Dasgupta & Stiglitz [1980]
and Gilbert & Newbery [1982]. Applied specifically to the network access question is Gans & King [2004].
However, these do not examine a must-offer provision that is the main focus of this paper. Moreover, this
literature does not endogenize the size of capacity, but focuses on timing only.
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2.3. Pre-emptive investment
Pre-emptive investment (i.e. the choice of interconnector capacity and/or timing with the
intention of deterring subsequent interconnector investment) may well be plausible. Planned
and realised examples in Australia, the US and Europe suggest that interconnector markets
can be quite large and that quite small lines may be viable. Subsequent entry is a reasonable
option and thus pre-emptive investment may be a plausible strategy.
This section examines the effects of an MO provision in the face of potentially pre-
emptive investment. The mechanism is slightly different from the mechanism in the sections
above. Following the seminal approach of Dixit [1980], entry deterrence is made more
effective if the first mover can credibly commit to fully use his capacity post-entry, to the
disadvantage of the entrant. Entry deterrence without an MO provision is only credible if the
post-entry profit-maximising output, based on marginal cost net of sunk investment, leaves
the entrant’s profit just negative. A larger post-entry output is not credible even if faced with
excess capacity. Where entry deterrence is not or no longer credible, an explicit MO
provision will have the effect to make the entry deterrent capacity credible and may therefore
enhance the ability to deter entry. Although somewhat surprisingly, this may enhance
welfare. As for example von Weiszäcker [1980] pointed out, entry barriers might have
beneficial effects if in the post-entry market both players adopted Cournot strategies that
would induce excessive entry. The same reasoning underlies the welfare effects here. The
MO provision works as an entry barrier that can have both positive and negative welfare
effects. There may be a (narrow) range of values of fixed and variable capacity values that
make an MO provision welfare decreasing, but as fixed costs become less important, the
value of the MO provision in deterring multiple duplicative entry increases, enhancing social
welfare.
This has some similarity to the finding of Eaton and Ware [1987], who consider a
normal market with sequential market entry. They find that “strategic entry deterrence is
ordinarily welfare improving” although they only allow the incumbent to deter entry by
strategic investment, not by an MO provision. In our setting giving the firm additional power
to deter entry by imposing an MO provision when otherwise multiple entry would occur is
welfare improving.
The setting is as follows: firm 1 is the merchant investor who considers strategic pre-
emption; firm 2 is the (first) potential entrant who contemplates building a parallel
interconnector. The game is sequential in three stages. In stage 1 firm 1 invests in the line and
decides (irreversibly) on the capacity. At stage 2 firm 2 decides whether or not to invest in a
line, after observing the sunk capacity of the first firm. In the final stage 3 trading establishes
the price in the energy markets given the capacity of the line(s). We assume that if entry
occurs, there is a well-defined order in which possible entrants take decisions, that there is no
uncertainty about future demand, and that the form of competition post entry depends on
whether or not there is a MO provision. Under MO the first investor will offer full capacity,
and any potential entrant anticipates this when choosing capacity. Without the MO provision,
the incumbent can choose to reduce output if this would increase profits, given subsequent
entrants’ capacity choices (which will in equilibrium be fully used). For the most part we
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only need to consider cases where there is room for at most two entrants. If entry cannot be
deterred and fixed costs are low enough, a whole sequence of firms will enter, causing
excessive fixed cost duplication. Eaton and Ware (1987] show how to solve for the multiple
entry case, which does not change our welfare results.
If the first investor predicts that entry will occur, he will choose a smaller capacity to
ensure that in the post-entry game he has no idle capacity. The capacity choice can therefore
be modelled as a Stackelberg game. As before, residual demand for interconnector capacity is
linear, so p = a – b(Q1 +  Q2), as is the cost function for (constructing) the line:
iii KFKC ⋅+= β)( ,   for firms i = 1, 2. (28)
The question to be addressed is whether social welfare with an MO provision (SWW) is larger
or smaller than social welfare without an MO provision.
Consider figure 2, which outlines the strategies against the level of the fixed costs (the
equations are derived below).
Figure 2: Overview of pre-emptive investment
If F is large, entry will not be profitable even without an MO provision. In that case the first
mover simply invests in the monopoly capacity and produces accordingly and blockades
entry as a by-effect. Thus an MO provision would have no effect. If F is below FC, it is
always profitable to deter entry (and avoid duplicating fixed costs) provided this is possible,
which requires an MO, otherwise inefficient entry will occur lowering social welfare. To the
right of point FA, strategic entry deterrence is profitable exploiting the asymmetry in sunk
costs and an MO is not needed to deter entry.
The policy relevant range is thus below FA. FA determines where fixed costs F are
sufficiently low such that entry deterrence based on asymmetry of sunk costs is not profitable
and thus entry deterring investment is not credible without an MO. Below FA, an MO
provision makes a difference and therefore will have an effect on social welfare. Proposition
4 below shows that between FC and FA a MO provision has adverse effects, but below FC it is
beneficial.
To establish these claims, the Stackelberg game must be solved backwards. If the
entrant chooses to enter, he will choose output Q2 = K2 to maximise:
( )23
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19
2 1 2 2 2
s P( Q ,Q ) Q Q Fpi β= ⋅ − ⋅ − . (29)
The first-order condition gives the reaction function:
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Without an MO provision firm 1 cannot commit to an ex post unprofitable level of output. In
the case of blockaded entry, the choice of the first mover’s capacity ignoring the threat of
entry will be sufficient to make subsequent entry unprofitable. In that case the monopoly
solution is:
 ,
2b
-a
 =K Q m β11 = (31)
so that if another investor entered he would choose output:
. 
4b
-a
 =Q β2 (32)
The first mover’s preferred level of capacity and output will blockade entry without an MO
provision if the entrant’s profits would be negative at this choice of output, Q1, which
requires F > (a - β)2/16b. The first mover may still be able to deter output by selecting a level
of capacity very slightly higher than the ex post profit maximising level of output given entry,
for in this case his marginal cost will be zero, not β, and hence his profit maximising choice
of output, Q1, will maximise (using 2’s reaction function, sQ2 ):
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With an MO provision, firm 1 will choose Q1 = K1 to deter entry by making the output choice
of the potential entrant, given K1, unprofitable; 02 ≤
spi  for sQ2 . This requires K1 ≥ KL, the
limit capacity:
γβ −−=
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aK L , with 
b
F
b
bF 44
==γ . (35)
The pre-emptive capacity is equal to the competitive output minus a positive fraction which
depends on b and fixed costs F. In line with standard theory on limit pricing, the limit
capacity decreases if demand gets more elastic (i.e. b is small) and if fixed costs increase
ceteris paribus.15
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 Cf. for instance Gilbert [1989] for an overview.
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The first mover will be able to deter entry without an MO provision if the entrant’s
profits would be negative at this choice of output, Q1, otherwise entry would be
accommodated. Equalising K1S from (34) and KL from (35) and solving for F gives the lowest
level of fixed costs for which entry is deterred without an MO provision: F = (a - 3β)2/16b.
This in turn gives
Proposition 3: If F < (a - 3β)2/16b, the MO provision induces entry-deterring behaviour
whereas without an MO provision entry deterrence would not be profitable.
Denote SWw as social welfare with an MO provision (entry deterrence), and SWac as social
welfare in the Stackelberg duopoly (entry accommodation). The entry-deterrent MO
provision increases welfare if:
0 0
2
w acQ Q
w w ac acSW p( Q )dQ Q F p( Q )dQ Q F SWβ β= − ⋅ − > − ⋅ − =∫ ∫
(36)
The values for the limits can be determined as Qw = KL and Qac = 3(a -β)/4b, and the integrals
evaluated to give the following proposition:
Proposition 4: If ( )
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This condition is only satisfied for x = β/a < 0.1277, or β/a > 0.4605, the two roots of the
quadratic equation 17x2 - 10x + 1 > 0, and for values between these roots, the MO provision
either does not have an effect or is welfare increasing (depending on the size of F). If β is
very low, the costs of entry deterrence are low while at the same time entry deterrence
requires relatively large capacity as a result of which the additional competition from the
entrant has a relatively small effect. On balance, the MO provision is more likely to increase
social welfare with low β. If β is high, entry deterrence in the absence of an MO provision is
more credible, which increases the range in which an MO provision is irrelevant: in figure 2,
FA shifts to the left.
3. MARKET POWER WITHIN THE IMPORTING COUNTRY
The analysis so far ignores any independent strategic behaviour on the part of domestic
generators, and concentrates on the potential for the interconnector owner to influence market
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prices. This is reasonable if there is a domestic incumbent who also controls access to the
interconnector, and faces a residual demand (from a fringe of competitive generators and
consumer demand). However, these are exactly the circumstances in which a regulator or
competition authority would wish to limit the incumbent's access to the interconnector, both by
prohibition on dominant ownership of the interconnector (and/or its capacity) and by suitable
interconnector auction design (Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery, 2004).
If dominant domestic generators are prevented both from owning and holding capacity
on the interconnector, then there is a potential interaction between the market power of
incumbents and of the agent controlling the size and use of the interconnector. This becomes
important for any welfare analysis of alternative regimes, as domestic prices no longer properly
measure marginal social costs and benefits.
The simplest case to analyse has competitive prices in the exporting country, at level m
(independent of interconnector volumes, Q, at any date, but possibly varying from period to
period, as with Norwegian electricity, where Norwegian prices depend on hydro conditions).
Within the importing country there are n domestic incumbents each with constant marginal cost
c, each producing q, and selling at domestic price p. Total relevant supply is nq + Q, where as
before, the inverse demand schedule is p = a – b(nq+Q).
A merchant interconnector would be built and operated by a company with no
generation assets, while a regulated interconnector would be jointly financed by each country,
and the trading profits divided in proportion to ownership (assumed equal). In the static case,
demand is known and on average constant (though it may vary over a number of possible states
of the world) and the exporting country's price is similarly constant on average even if it differs
in each state. As before, the merchant investor chooses capacity, K, with and without an MO
provision, which will be ranked in terms of the social welfare of the importing country, and
compared to a (possibly more expensive) efficiently priced regulated interconnector under
shared ownership. If the interconnector capacity is adequate, the price differential (pm - px)
between the countries will be equal to the line’s capacity expansion costs β.
3.1  Deterministic demand in both countries
The main question is how the market equilibrates and with what impact on social welfare,
compared to a more expensive regulated interconnector. (The higher cost, F* + β*K, may reflect
the slower process in deciding on the interconnector, or the inefficiencies of regulation rather
than private ownership, or both.)
As with the case of pre-emption, the investor in the interconnector has a first-mover
advantage, and must decide whether to invest with the intention of aggressively discouraging
incumbent output, or whether to accommodate.  The difference here is that the incumbents have
already sunk their investment costs and will choose to operate in any case, while the marginal
cost of interconnector investment exceeds that of operation, discouraging over-investment and
making the MO provision irrelevant. The equilibrium is found by first identifying the incumbent
reaction function. Each incumbent chooses output q given imports over the interconnector, Q, so
that its equilibrium output will be
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(The initial equilibrium can be found by setting Q = 0.) Consider the choice of interconnector
capacity assuming that K = Q  in equations (39) and (40). Interconnector profits will be
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The profit maximising choice of K will be
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where B ≡ (n+1)(m+β). The interconnector would be fully used ex post if the Nash-Cournot
output ignoring the investment cost is at least as great as capacity, which it must be, as the ex
ante marginal cost of investment is greater than the ex post marginal cost of use. The price will
be
.  
n
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= p )1(2 + (42)
Profits, which have to be non-negative after covering the fixed cost F, are
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This requires
 ,bFn > B-nc+a )1(4 + (44)
and so p > m+β, the relevant marginal cost of importing.
Impact of the interconnector on social welfare
In the absence of an interconnector social welfare (defined as the sum of producer and consumer
surplus) is n(n+2)(a – c)2/(2(n+1)2b). If the interconnector is built the importing country's social
welfare will be the resident share of the merchant profit plus domestic producer and consumer
surplus:
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The interconnector clearly increases social welfare if marginal import costs are less than
marginal domestic costs, i.e. if c > m+β, but that is not guaranteed by the private profitability of
the interconnector, (43). The change in welfare resulting from the interconnector is given by the
equation
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Proposition 5: For c > c*, social welfare is increased by allowing the construction of a merchant
interconnnector, and reduced for c < c*, where c* < m+ β.
The proof is the Appendix. The proposition is unsurprising, for the extra competition from a
merchant interconnector reduces the deadweight loss from inefficient domestic competition and
so it may be desirable to import at a (long-run) marginal cost (including fixed costs) above the
marginal domestic production cost. It also follows that merchants may profitably invest
(exploiting the wedge between price and production costs on the energy market) while the
investment is welfare decreasing. This suggests that it may be a need to have a regulatory test
before approving the merchant interconnector, and a sufficient condition is m+β < c.
Regulated interconnector
If the interconnector is built as a regulated line, we can ask what value of K maximises W for the
importing country. By regulated we mean here that building the line needs the regulator’s
approval and more importantly, that the regulator directly or indirectly determines the line’s
capacity. A regulated interconnector may have higher costs than a merchant line, but if β* + m <
c it could be cheaper to import all domestic demand and eliminate local production. On the other
hand if β* + m > c > m the only merit of the interconnector is as a rather expensive way of
mitigating domestic market power. If domestic marginal costs were increasing, then some level
of imports might be desirable, and the problem might then be better posed. We consider this
alternative below.
If we nevertheless stay with the linear model, and consider social welfare from the
importing country’s perspective, assuming that it finances the interconnector and thus receives
all the net profit of the interconnector. This is in contrast to the merchant case above where the
profits were shared between the two countries. To this must be added domestic consumer and
producer surplus to give the total social benefits, W:
( )( ) GI nnqKpaW pipi +++−= 21 (47)
Using q and p from (38) and (39) respectively, the FOC w.r.t. K is:
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The optimal capacity is:
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Optimal capacity K* decreases with larger n and (m + β*). The trade-off involved here is the
effect of higher competition on the home market, which requires a large capacity, versus the
import of expensive power, which reduces optimal capacity. It is clear that if (m + β*) < c the
interconnector capacity should be equal to the entire size of the market. The case of interest is
where (m + β*) > c.
Interestingly, it is ambiguous whether the welfare maximising capacity (K*) is larger
or smaller than the profit maximising Kmax from (41). Comparison reveals that Kmax < K*, if:
( ) ( )( )*13232 22 β+++>++ mnncnna . (50)
If n is large (competitive home production market) and (m + β*) > c, the LHS < RHS and
thus Kmax > K*. With a competitive home market and expensive imports, society does not gain
from the interconnector and wants the line to be small. As has been pointed out by Joskow &
Tirole (2005), in these circumstances, a merchant line will be too large rather than too small.
Logically, as the line does not pass the regulatory test it should not be built as a merchant
line, and there should be better ways of addressing local market power. On the other hand,
assuming n =1 and solving the condition gives:
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Thus if n is low and m + β* not too high, Kmax < K* and conversely.
Extensions to tender auctions for merchant interconnectors
Under circumstances where merchant interconnectors will be typically under-sized, a regulator
concerned with maximising social benefits might organise an auction to determine the size of
the interconnector. A natural choice of auction design is to accept the merchant proposal with
the largest capacity, which again raises the question whether such an interconnector should be
subject to an MO provision or not. In this case the MO provision has opposing effects and the
choice is not unambiguous. In general, however, the MO provision is more likely to be welfare
enhancing than in the case of unregulated MTI.
It is clear that waiving the MO provision will lead to a (weakly) larger interconnector, as
the profits for any given size of interconnector are (weakly) higher without MO for each given
size than with MO. In a competitive tender the higher profits will be bid away; by auction design
the winning bid is the highest capacity possible with non-negative profits. This results in over-
investment and increases the incentives for capacity withholding. As the MO decreases the (ex
post) profits, the winning bid has lower capacity and thus lowers the extent of over-investment.
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In the reference case, the MO provision enhances welfare in case of a competitive tender. As
shown in section 2, the MO provision weakly decreases welfare under demand uncertainty and
demand growth, establishing opposing effects. With an organised tender, pre-emptive
investment to hold off a second investor will not be an issue.
Extension to increasing marginal cost
A more general, although somewhat more complex analysis, might consider increasing domestic
costs, making the social case for imports less critically dependent on the condition β* + m > c >
m. If there is a single dominant incumbent whose cost function is C(q) = cq + ½γq2, marginal
cost will be c + γq and the incumbent’s reaction function will be
.
b
)bQc- a(
 = q
γ+
−
2
(52)
It is then possible to repeat the previous analysis and to find a wider range of conditions under
which an interconnector is socially beneficial.
3.2 Uncertain import costs
Again applying a MO provision, we now turn to uncertainty in the cost of imports; the
analysis is similar to demand uncertainty as in section 2.1, but here the interconnector faces
an import energy market and thus residual demand. The more normal case is that the
interconnector takes advantage of varying price differences between countries, which can be
represented by variability in the price of imports, so that m becomes a random variable taking
different values ms in different states of the world s. Let αs be the probability of state s, with
Σαs = 1, with the expected value Ems = Σαsms = m. Incumbent domestic generators maximise
profits conditional upon the interconnector output. If there is no MO provision, then the
interconnector maximizes expected profits as a Stackelberg leader given the reaction
functions of (38):
( ) ( )∑∑ −−−−−=
s
ssI
s
ssssI
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KQFKQmp
s
λβαpi
,
max , (53)
with ps given by (39) for Q = Qs. The first order conditions (FOCs) are:
0
1
2
=−





−
+
−+
=
∂
∂
ss
s
s
s
I m
n
bQnca
Q λα
pi
, for all s  (54)
0=+−=
∂
∂
∑
s
s
I
K
λβpi . (55)
In the simple case there are two states, a low import price state s = L and a high price state H:
mL < mH.  If mH < mL + β/αL, capacity will not be withheld even if there is no MO provision
as there is a positive shadow price on capacity in both states, λH , λL > 0, so that QL = QH = K.
If mH > mL + β/αL, it is attractive to withhold capacity if legal: λH = 0 and λL = β.
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No capacity withholding
If mH < mL + β/αL then QL = QH = K. Solving the FOCs for these assumptions then gives the
same result as in the deterministic case (41):
( )( )
b
Bnca
b
mnncaK N
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β
,  where m = Ems  B = (n+1)(m+β) (56)
Capacity withholding
Now suppose that mH > mL + β/αL, then λH = 0, λL = β. Solving the FOCs using these
assumptions:
( )
b
mnncaQ HwH 2
1+−+
=  , (57)
and
( )( )
b
mnncaKQ LLwwL 2
/1 αβ++−+
== . (58)
It is evident that mH > mL + β/αL is the condition for wwH KQ < . As in section 2.1, if there is
an MO provision that has an effect, (i.e. if mH > mL + β/αL) then the MO provision results in
less investment. That is, KMO < Kw, for then KMO = KN as in (56), and mL+β/αL < m+β,
because then m+β = (1- αL) mH +αL mL + β = (1- αL)(mL +β/αL + ε)+ αL mL + β for some ε
> 0.
Define the expected value of a variable x: Ex = αH xH +αL xL. Then we have
Lemma 1: The expected price and output are the same with or without MO or E(Q+nq) =
(Q+nq)N and Ep = pN.
Proof: From (57) plus (58) and (56), EQ = QN. Using (38) and substituting EQQQ wHwL ,,
gives: Eq = qN. It follows that E(Q+nq) = (Q+nq)N and Ep = pN.
Proposition 6: An MO provision weakly decreases welfare under import cost uncertainty.
The proof is in the Appendix.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Unregulated merchant transmission investment (MTI) means that the sole source of revenue
for the investment comes from trading between the markets the line interconnects, rather than
being supplemented from the pool of regulated connection charges. Moreover, the investment
can be undertaken by new, possibly more entrepreneurial companies than the designated
transmission system operators (TSOs). TSOs are charged to deliver a secure and economical
transmission service to their domestic clients, and may overlook commercial activities such
as investing in interconnectors. If they do and ask for them to be treated as regulated
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investments, then domestic regulators may be sceptical of their true social benefit. The
resulting stalemate risks serious underinvestment in network assets, and is appears to be a
powerful driver for merchant investment. The paper focuses on the European institutional
framework as opposed to the USA and thereby on direct-current interconnectors linking
different countries (or regions under different TSOs). An interesting topical case is a planned
interconnector between the UK and the Netherlands, called BritNed.
Merchant interconnectors raise a set of regulatory questions, one which is whether or
not to apply a must-offer (MO) provision. The legislative context for MTI in Europe has been
laid down in the EU Regulation on Cross-border Exchanges which entered into force in July
2004. The Regulation as currently formulated includes an MO provision although this may
not have been consciously intended for new interconnectors,. Such provisions are not
uncommon and quite uncontroversial for existing assets (both generation and
interconnectors), but raise questions for new interconnectors where the investment decision
still has to be made. The basic trade-off is that an MO provision, obliging the line owner to
offer all capacity into the market, increases short-term welfare, but at the expense of reduced
capacity and thus lower long-term welfare. This paper identifies circumstances in which the
balance is in favour or against an MO provision.
An MO provision tackles (strategic) capacity withholding. Given that the capacity
decision still has to be made and given that revenues are unregulated it is not immediately
obvious why capacity withholding would be a profitable strategy. We examined three cases:
demand uncertainty, demand growth and pre-emptive investment.
If demand uncertainty is the reason for capacity withholding, applying an MO
provision is unambiguously weakly welfare decreasing. The analysis parallels the peak-load
pricing literature and includes the case of demand variability. An MO provision sets
incentives to reduce invested capacity; the MO provision increases welfare in periods of low
demand but at the expense of higher foregone welfare in periods of high demand. Given that
uncertainty is a reason for unregulated MTI in the first place, this argument seems to be
particularly relevant.
If interconnector demand is growing, then an MO provision delays the welfare-
enhancing investment and reduces capacity. Numerical analysis suggests that this will
decrease welfare. As the fear of under-investment is a main reason for allowing unregulated
MTI, having a policy which delays the investment appears inconsistent.
 If strategic pre-emptive investment (to deter the building of a second line) is a risk,
the welfare effects of an MO provision are ambiguous and depend on the relative fixed costs
of building the line. For sufficiently large fixed costs, an MO provision has no effect. For
sufficiently small fixed costs, the MO provision will makes ex post threat of using all
capacity credible beyond the level that would otherwise not be credible without the MO
provision. Within this range, for relatively large fixed costs, the MO provision decreases
welfare (deterring entry would be welfare decreasing), and for relatively small fixed costs,
welfare will increase (because entry deterrence with MO increases welfare).
We also investigated the case of incumbent market power on the importing energy
market and where the line would compete with domestic producers. The new issue is that the
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market power in the importing energy market drives a wedge between price and costs. As a
result a merchant interconnector might profitably import power that is more expensive than
domestic power. The line has both a competitive effect (reducing domestic allocative
inefficiency) and an import effect (which may displace cheaper power). The overall welfare
effect may be positive or negative, depending on the relative costs. Assuming uncertainty (or
variability) in import costs, we find that the MO provision somewhat surprisingly (weakly)
lowers welfare. Finally, the social welfare maximising capacity can be larger or smaller than
the profit maximising capacity, reflecting the trade-off between the effect of increased
competition and expensive imports.
Overall, our investigations suggest that the new EU Regulation on Cross-Border
Exchanges is unhelpful in requiring an MO provision regardless of the particular
circumstances of the case. If a simple rule is required, it would seem better not to require an
MO provision, but leave it to the regulator to decide what additional conditions, if any, to
place on merchant interconnectors. In the presence of market power, such interconnectors
should in any case be subject to a regulatory test, and that is the natural moment at which to
define the regulatory regime affecting the interconnector.
The question of how to improve the social benefits of MTI undoubtably deserves
further investigation. Tender auctions for various forms of capacity and contracts are
increasingly being used in the electricity industry, and their design is increasingly recognised
as critical to their success (Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery, 2004). The problem here is how to
reward entrepreneurs who invest perhaps considerable resources in identifying attractive
investment opportunities that have previously been overlooked, with a desire to reap
maximum social value from exploiting the opportunity. As with patent protection, it may be
necessary to accept some allocative inefficiency from the exercise of market power in order
to induce the discovery of socially useful opportunities.
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APPENDIX
The derivation of optimal T and K in section 2.2
The investor chooses K, T to maximise (15). The first order conditions are
( ) ,0 =  F + )K-a( - Kbe e = T gT 2rT- βpi −∂∂ (A1)
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This can be solved for K and T using (A2) to give (15) and (16).
Derivation of the social optimum in zero price initial period in section 2.2
Substituting for Q(t) from (20) in (19) gives
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where M is determined by K. The first order conditions for T and K can now be found:
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The choice of K is given by
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These equations can be solved to give the socially optimal values K*, T* of (17) and (18).
The second case of under-used capacity holds provided M > T. From (21) and (23)
this requires
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This is equivalent to
 ,2  a  
g
g+r θβ >< (A10)
where the second inequality comes from the requirement for the investment data and amount
to be positive.
Proof of proposition 5 in section 3
The derivative of ∆W with respect to c is proportional to
,mnnn-cn+ann ))(463(2)8(2)8126( 2332 β+++++−+ (A11)
and since a = c + ε for ε > 0 from (38), (A11) is positive if
.0))(463()462( 232 >−−+++−+ βε mcnnn+nn (A12)
This will be the case for c > c** for some c**. That in turn ensures that there exists a c*, c** <
c* <  m+β, such that ∆W = 0.
QED.
Proof to proposition 6 in section 3
We have to prove that
Nw SWSW ≥ , (A13)
(where the superscripts refer to capacity Withholding and No capacity withholding). This can
be rewritten as:
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where CS is consumer surplus and πG is the aggregate for all n generators. The difference in
consumer surplus is
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ).21 NNHHHHLLLL nqQpanqQpanqQpa +−−+−++− αα (A15)
From Lemma 1 this is:
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]HHHHLLLLNN nqQpnqQpnqQp +−+−+ αα21 , (A16)
which is positive if p and (Q + nq) are negatively correlated, which holds because demand is
downward sloping. Thus the net effect of capacity withholding on CS is positive.
Clearly the profits of the interconnector are always weakly higher under capacity
withholding than under MO, otherwise the firm would not withhold capacity. The profits of
the generators are also weakly higher under capacity withholding than under an MO
provision. Capacity withholding has an effect on generator output via the interconnector
output and price; the generators do not withhold capacity themselves.
( ) ( ) ( ) NNHHHLLL qcpqcpqcp −≥−+− αα (A17)
which simplifies to:
NN
HHHLLL qpqpqp ≥+αα (A18)
which, using Lemma 3, holds if p and q are positively correlated. From downward-sloping
demand and the generators’ reaction function ((38), which is inversely related to the
Interconnector’s output), this is the case.
QED
